Soft Surveillance Mandatory Voluntarism and the Collection of Personal Data

Soft Surveillance Mandatory Voluntarism and the Collection of Personal Data
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Gary T. Marx
n Truro, Massachusetts, at the end of 2004, police politely asked all male resi- dents to provide a DNA sample to match
with DNA material found at the scene of an unsolved murder. Residents were approached in a non-threatening manner and asked to help solve the crime. This tactic of rounding up all the usual suspects and then some is still rare in the United States for historical, legal, and logistical reasons, but it is becoming more com- mon. The Truro case illustrates expanding trends in surveillance and social control.
There is increased reliance on “soft” means for collecting personal information. In crimi- nal justice contexts these means involve some or all of the following: persuasion to gain vol- untary compliance, universality or at least in- creased inclusiveness, and emphasis on the needs of the community relative to the rights of the individual.
As with other new forms of surveillance and detection, the process of gathering the DNA information is quick and painless, involving a mouth swab, and is generally not felt to be in- vasive. This makes such requests seem harm- less relative to the experience of having blood drawn, having an observer watch while a urine drug sample is produced, or being patted down or undergoing a more probing physical search.
In contrast, more traditional police meth- ods, such as an arrest, a custodial interroga- tion, a search, a subpoena, or traffic stop, are “hard.” They involve coercion and threat to gain involuntary compliance. They may also involve a crossing of intimate personal borders, as with a strip or body-cavity search. In principle such means are restricted by law and policy to per- sons there are reasons to suspect, and thus they implicitly recognize the liberty of the individual
relative to the needs of the community. Yet the culture of social control is chang-
ing. Hard forms of control are not receding, but soft forms are expanding. I note several forms of this, from requesting volunteers based on appeals to good citizenship or patriotism to using disingenuous communication to profil- ing based on lifestyle and consumption to uti- lizing hidden or low-visibility, information col- lection techniques.
The theme of volunteering as good citizen- ship or patriotism can increasingly be seen in other contexts. Consider a Justice Department “Watch Your Car” program found in many states. Decals that car owners place on their vehicles serve as an invitation to police any- where in the United States to stop the car if they see it being driven late at night.
A related form of voluntarism involves us- ing citizens as adjuncts to law enforcement by watching others. Beyond the traditional Neigh- borhood Watch, we can note new post-9/11 programs, such as a police-sponsored C.A.T. EYES (Community Anti-Terrorism Training Initiative), and efforts to encourage truckers, utility workers, taxi drivers, and delivery per- sons to report suspicious activity.
There also appears to be an increase in fed- eral prosecutors’ asking corporations under in- vestigation to waive their attorney/client privi- lege. This can provide information that is not otherwise available—in return for indicting only lower level personnel. Plea bargaining shares a similar logic of coercive “volunteer- ing,” often hidden under a judicially sanctified and sanitized veneer of disguised coercion.
Another “soft” method involves disingenu- ous communication that seeks to create the impression that one is volunteering when that isn’t the case. Consider the following: • the ubiquitous building signs, “In entering here you have agreed to be searched” • a message from the Social Security Admin-
Soft Surveillance Mandatory Voluntarism and the Collection of Personal Data
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istration to potential recipients: “While it is voluntary for you to furnish this information, we may not be able to pay benefits to your spouse unless you give us the information” • a Canadian airport announcement: “Notice: Security measures are being taken to observe and inspect persons. No passengers are obliged to submit to a search of persons or goods if they choose not to board our aircraft”
A related form of soft surveillance involves corporations more than government. Note the implicit bargain with respect to technologies of consumption in which the collection of per- sonally identifiable (and often subsequently marketed) information is built into the very activity. We gladly, if often barely consciously, give up this information in return for the ease of buying and communicating and the seduc- tions of frequent-flyer and other reward pro- grams. Information collection is unseen and automated (in a favored engineering goal, “the human is out of the loop”), generating the ap- pearance of actions that are neutral and ob- jective and ignoring the choices inherent in the design of the system. Data gathering is “natu- rally” folded into routine activities such as driv- ing a car; watching television; or using a credit card, computer, or telephone.
And then there are those who agree to re- port their consumption behavior and attitudes in more detail as part of market research. A new variant goes beyond the traditional paid “volunteers” of the Nielsen ratings and other consumer research. Volunteers are given free samples and talking points. They seek to cre- ate “buzz” about new products without reveal- ing their connection to the sponsoring busi- ness. According to a New York Times Magazine story, Procter and Gamble for example has 240,000 volunteers in its teenage product pro- paganda/diffusion network. Although many call, few are chosen (10 percent–15 percent) for this highly coveted role. These volunteer intelligence and marketing agents report on their own and others’ responses to products, take surveys, and participate in focus groups.
What is at stake here isn’t merely im- proved advertising in intensely competitive industries but a new and morally ambiguous form of tattling. Regardless of whether they are compensated, the providers of information
to marketing research are also volunteering information on those who share their charac- teristics and experiences. However, no direct benefits flow to the mass of persons the spon- soring agency learns about. There are paral- lels to DNA analysis here: an individual who voluntarily offers his or her information also simultaneously offers information on family members who have not agreed to this. We lack an adequate conceptual, ethical, and legal framework for considering this spillover effect from voluntary to involuntary disclosure in- volving third parties.
We can also note changes in a related cul- tural area, involving the willing, even gleeful public exposure of private information— whether in dress styles, cell phone conversa- tions, or the mass media. Many Americans are drawn to new communications technologies like nails to a magnet, unable to resist the pru- rient call to watch others, but also with a near Dostoyevskian compulsion to offer information about themselves. There can be psychological gratifications from revelation for both the revealer and the recipient of the information.
The prying and often inane television talk and reality shows, Web cam pages, Web logs, the goofy waving of fans at televised events, and videotaping of conceptions, births, and last wills and testaments suggest the extent to which we have become both a performance and a spectator society—literally from the be- ginning of life to the end.
Searching Made Easy Many forms of voluntarism are encouraged by techniques designed to be less directly inva- sive. Computers scan dispersed personal records for suspicious cases, avoiding, at least initially, any direct review by a human. Simi- larly X-ray and scent machines “search” per- sons and goods for contraband without touch- ing them. Inkless fingerprints can be taken without the stained thumb symbolic of the ar- rested person. Classified government programs are said to permit the remote reading of com- puters and their transmissions without the need to directly install a bugging device.
Beyond the ease of gathering DNA, con- sider the change from a urine drug test requir- ing an observer, to drug tests that require a
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strand of hair, sweat, or saliva. Saliva is par- ticularly interesting. Whatever can be revealed from the analysis of blood or urine is also po- tentially found (although in smaller quantities) in saliva—not only evidence of disease and DNA, but also of drugs taken and pregnancy. The recent development of non-electrical sen- sors now makes it possible to detect molecules at minute levels in saliva.
To take blood is to pierce the body’s pro- tective armor. But expectorating occurs easily, frequently, and is more “natural” than punc- turing a vein. Nor does it involve the unwanted observation required for a urine drug sample. Saliva samples can be taken easily and end- lessly, and the changes charted in them make possible the early identification of problems.
This may offer medical diagnostic advan- tages to the individual. Diagnostic spitting as a condition of employment is obviously of in- terest to employers concerned with rising health costs and resistance to urine drug tests—and eager to avoid liability for the ill- nesses of those who work around hazardous chemicals.
Authorities concerned with identifying those who spit when not requested to can also use the technology. The transit authority in Sheffield, England, as part of an anti-spitting campaign, distributed three thousand DNA swab kits to transportation staff. Posters pro- claim “Spit? It’s Out” and warn persons who spit that “ . . . you can be traced—and pros- ecuted. Even if we don’t know what you look like. And your record will be on the national DNA database. Forever.”
The automated analysis of urine offers many of the advantages of saliva. A diagnostic test routinely used in some Japanese employ- ment contexts requires that each employee who enters a stall be identified through an ac- cess card. This permits a comprehensive record of flushed offerings over time. It is said to be of great benefit in the early diagnosis of health problems, and it can also determine drug use, recent sexual activity, and pregnancy.
In many of these cases citizens are at least informed of what is going on, even if the mean- ing of their consent is open to question. More troubling is the development of tactics that need not rely on the subject’s consenting or
even being informed. New hidden or low-vis- ibility technologies increasingly offer the tempting possibility of bypassing awareness, and thus any need for direct consent, alto- gether.
New technologies overcome traditional barriers, such as darkness or walls. Night-vi- sion technology illuminates what darkness tra- ditionally protected (and the technology is it- self protected, unlike an illuminated spotlight). Thermal imaging technology applied from out- side can offer a rough picture of a building’s interior based on heat patterns. There is no need for the observer to enter the space.
A person’s DNA can be collected from a drinking glass or from discarded dental floss. Facial-scanning requires only a tiny lens. Smart machines can “smell” contraband, eliminating the need for a warrant or for asking subjects for permission to invade their olfactory space or “see” through their clothes and luggage. Be- yond the traditional reading of visual clues of- fered by facial expression, there are claims that
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the covert analysis of heat patterns around the eyes and of tremors in the voice and the mea- surement of brain wave patterns offer windows into feelings and truth telling. The face still remains a tool for protecting inner feelings and thoughts, but for how long?
Individuals need not be informed that their communications devices, vehicles, wallet cards, and consumer items increasingly will have RFID (Radio Frequency Identification) chips embedded in them that can be designed to be passively read by unseen sensors from up to thirty feet away.
In the convoluted logic of those who jus- tify covert (or non-informed) data collection and use, individuals “volunteer” their data by walking or driving on public streets or enter- ing a shopping mall; by failing to hide their faces or wear gloves or encrypt their commu- nications; or by choosing to use a phone, com- puter, or a credit card. The statement of a di- rect marketer nicely illustrates this: “Never ever underestimate the willingness of the American public to tell you about itself. That data be- longs to us! . . . [I]t isn’t out there because we stole it . . . Someone gave it away and now it’s out there for us to use.”
No Easy Answers In an environment of intense concern about crime and terrorism and a legal framework gen- erated in a far simpler time, the developments discussed above are hardly surprising. Demo- cratic governments need to be reasonably ef- fective and to maintain their legitimacy (even as research on the complex relationships be- tween effectiveness and legitimacy is needed). Working together and sacrificing a bit of one- self for the common good, particularly in times of crisis, is hardly controversial. Relative to tra- ditional authoritarian settings, many of the above examples show respect for the person in offering notice and some degree of choice and in minimizing invasiveness. Such efforts draw on the higher civic traditions of demo- cratic participation, self-help, and community. They may also deter. Yet there is something troubling about them.
The accompanying rhetoric is often dishon- est and insulting to one’s intelligence. Typical is a phone company executive who, in defense
of unblockable caller ID, said, “When you choose to make a phone call you are choosing to release your telephone number.” In the same World Cup League of Disingenuousness is the statement of a personnel manager in a one-in- dustry town, “We don’t require anyone to take a drug test, only those who choose to work here.”
To be meaningful, choice should imply genuine alternatives and refusal costs that are not wildly exorbitant. Absent that, we have trickery, double-talk, and inequitable relation- ships. When we are told that for the good of the community we must voluntarily submit to searches or provide information, we run the danger of the tyranny of turning presumptions of innocence upside down. If only the guilty need worry, why bother with a Bill of Rights and other limits on authority? There also comes a point beyond which social pressure seems un- reasonable. If the case for categorical informa- tion is strong, then the law ought to require it without need of the verbal gymnastics of ask- ing for volunteers or arguing that subjects are in fact taking voluntary action in the full mean- ing of the term, when they aren’t.
Those who fail to volunteer can be viewed as having something to hide or as being bad citizens. The positive reasons for rejecting such requests are ignored. Yet we all have things to hide or, more properly, to reveal selectively, depending on the relationship and context. The general social value we place on sealed first- class letters, window blinds, and bathroom doors, and our opposition to indiscriminate wiretapping, bugging, and informing, or to giv- ing up anonymity in public places (absent cause), are hardly driven by an interest in aid- ing the guilty. Sealing juvenile criminal records does not reflect a perverse strategy for infil- trating miscreants into adult life, but rather an understanding of, and some compassion for, the mistakes of youth.
We value privacy not to protect wrongdo- ing, but because an appropriate degree of con- trol over personal and social information is cen- tral to our sense of self, autonomy, and mate- rial well-being—as well as being necessary for independent group actions. A healthy, if nec- essarily qualified, suspicion of authority is also a factor in restricting information sought by the
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more powerful. As consumers and citizens we have an interest in avoiding the manipulation, discrimination, and theft that can flow from combining bits of personal information that are innocuous by themselves.
Many of the new controls may seem more acceptable (or at least are less likely to be chal- lenged) because they are hidden or built-in and less invasive relative to the traditional forms of crossing personal and physical borders. We are also often complicit in their application— whether out of fear, convenience, or for fre- quent-shopper awards. Converting privacy to a commodity in which the seller receives some- thing in return to compensate for the invasion is a clever and defensible means of overcom- ing resistance.
Exchanges and less invasive searches are certainly preferable to data rip-offs and more invasive searches. However, the nature of the means does not determine its acceptability. What matters most is the appropriateness of collecting the information and only secondarily the way that it is collected. A search is still a search, regardless of how it is carried out. The issue of searches and the crossing of traditional borders between the civil and state sectors or the self and others involves much more than painless, quick, inexpensive (or positively re- warding), and non-embarrassing means.
Other factors being equal, soft ways are to be preferred to hard, even if the control/instru- mental goals of those applying the surveillance remain the same. Yet coercion at least has the virtue (if that’s what it is) of letting the sub- ject (or object) know what is happening. What we don’t know can hurt us as well.
No More Happy Overlaps There are also pragmatic issues: does the tac- tical work? I have found no cases where the request for voluntarily offered samples solved the case. A guilty person would have to be very stupid indeed to come forth and volunteer a DNA sample. In the Truro case, a suspect was eventually arrested, but the arrest was based on other evidence.
Traditionally (if accidentally) there was a happy overlap between three factors that lim- ited searches and protected personal informa- tion. The first was logistical. It was not cost-
or time-effective to search everyone. The sec- ond was law. More invasive searches were pro- hibited or inadmissible, absent cause and a warrant. The third reflected the affront expe- rienced in our culture when certain personal borders were involuntarily crossed (for ex- ample, strip and body-cavity searches, taking body fluids, and to a lesser degree, fingerprint- ing). Limited resources, the unpleasantness of invasive searchers (for both the searched and the searcher), and the ethos of a democratic society historically restricted searches.
These supports are no longer overlapping. Instead, they are being undermined by the mass media’s encouragement of fear and per- ceptions of crises and by the seductiveness of consumption—together with the development of inexpensive, less invasive, broad searching tools. Under these conditions one does not need a meteorologist to describe wind patterns.
The willingness to offer personal informa- tion and the fascination with the private as- pects of others’ lives is a partial legacy of the openness and transparency of the 1960s. But it also speaks to some need of the modern per- son (and perhaps, in particular, the American) to see and be seen and to know and be known about through the ubiquitous camera and re- lated means.
Volunteering one’s data and being digitally recorded and tracked is coming to be taken for granted as a means of asserting selfhood. This willful blurring of some of the lines between the public and private self and the ready avail- ability of technologies to transmit and receive personal data give new meaning to David Riesman’s concern with “other direction.”
Of course our sense of self and social par- ticipation have always depended on validation from others—on seeing ourselves in, and through, their eyes. But contemporary forms of validation induce a sense of pseudo-authen- ticity, an unbecoming narcissism, and a suspi- cious spy culture. The social functions of reti- cence and embarrassment and the role of with- held personal information as a currency of trust, friendship, and intimacy are greatly weak- ened.
The abundance of new opportunities for self-expression offered by contemporary tech- nologies must be considered alongside the less-
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ened control we have over information in dis- tant computer systems. Data shadows or ghosts based on tangents of personal information (stripped of context) increasingly affect our life chances. The subject often has little knowledge of the existence or consequences of these data- bases and of how they are constructed or might be challenged.
This complicated issue of reducing the richness of personal and social contexts to a limited number of variables is at the core of the ability of science to predict. It is central to current ideas about economic competitiveness. The data analyst goes from known empirical cases to equivalent cases that are not directly known. Because a given case can be classified relative to a statistical model as involving a high or low risk, it is presumed to be understood and thus controllable (at least on statistical or “probabilistic” bases). This may work fine for business or medical decisions, but civil liber- ties and civil rights are not based on statistical categories. They are presumed to be univer- sally applicable absent cause to deny them. So rationality and efficiency increasingly clash with many of our basic Enlightenment ideas of individualism and dignity—ideas that were better articulated and less contestable, in tech- nologically simpler times.
There is a chilling drift into a society where you have to provide ever-more personal infor- mation in order to prove that you are the kind of person who does not merit even more in- tensive scrutiny. Here we confront the insa- tiable information appetite generated by sci- entific knowledge in a risk-adverse society. In such a society, knowing more may only serve to increase the need for more information.
My concern is more with cultural and be- havioral developments than with the law. Cer- tainly we do not lack for contemporary ex- amples of constricted or trampled legal rights (for example, the unwelcome elements of the Patriot Act or American citizens held on ter- rorism charges without trial). Still, the grow- ing institutionalization of civil rights and civil liberties over the last century (involving race, gender, children, work, freedom of expression and association, searches, and lifestyles) is un- likely to be reversed. Jagged cycles rather than clean linearity will continue to characterize this
turbulent history. Wartime restrictions (whether Lincoln’s suspending of habeas cor- pus or limits on speech during the Second World War) have been lifted as calmer times returned. To be sure the evidence of ebbs is undeniable, but even in the shadow of 9/11 there are some flows as well, particularly at the state and local level. Consider, for example, the many cities that have passed resolutions criti- cal of the Patriot Act.
The cultural changes are worrisome be- cause they are diffuse, subtle, and unseen— and they often reflect choices that are diffi- cult to challenge in a democratic society. The possibility of wrongful choice is an inherent risk of democracy.
One’s liberty can be used to smoke, eat rich foods, drive environmentally unfriendly cars, and watch unreality television, as well as to volunteer personal information—whether to government or the commercial sector. A bad law can be challenged in court or repealed. A dangerous technology can be banned, regu- lated, or countered with a different technol- ogy. But the only way to respond to liberty- threatening choices of the kind discussed here is through dialogue and education (tools that are already disproportionately available to those supporting the current developments).
Is It Happening Here? Contrary to the familiar Orwellian concerns about the all-knowing eyes and ears of govern- ment, recent history suggests to some observ- ers the reverse problem—blindness, deafness, and inefficiency (for example, the 9/11 danger known only in retrospect, the failure of vari- ous airline passenger screening programs, wrongful convictions, and so on). In one sense, there are two problems with the new surveil- lance technologies. One is that they don’t work, and the other is that they work too well. If the first, they fail to prevent disasters, bring mis- carriages of justice, and waste resources. If the second, they can further inequality and invidi- ous social categorization; they chill liberty. These twin threats are part of the enduring paradox of democratic government that must be strong enough to maintain reasonable or- der but not so strong as to become undemo- cratic.
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The surveillance developments noted here are consistent with the strengthening of the neoliberal ethos of the last decade. The idea of voluntary compliance seems to fit with in- creased individual choices, costs, and risks. It simultaneously weakens many social protec- tions and pays less attention to the ways the social order produces bad choices and collec- tive problems. The consequences of these are then left to individual and private solutions. This generates a suspicious society in which paranoia is entangled with reality.
There is no single answer to how the new personal information collection techniques ought to be viewed and what, if anything, should (or can) be done about them. From genuine to mandatory voluntarism and from open to secret data collection—these are points on continuums. There are important moral differences between what can be known through the unaided senses and what can only be known through technologically enhanced senses. The moral and practical issues around the initial collection of information are distinct from its subsequent uses and protections.
Diverse settings—national security, domes- tic law enforcement, public order mainte- nance, health and welfare, commerce, bank- ing, insurance, public and private spaces and roles—do not allow for the rigid application of the same policies. The different roles of em- ployer-employee, merchant-consumer, land- lord-renter, police-suspect, and health pro- vider-patient involve legitimate conflicts of in- terests. Any social practice is likely to involve conflict of values.
We need a situational or contextual per- spective that acknowledges the richness of dif- ferent contexts, as well as the multiplicity of conflicting values within and across them.
n the face of the simplistic rhetoric of po- larized ideologues in dangerous times, we need attention to trade-offs and to the ap-
propriate weighing of conflicting values. There is no fixed golden balance point. However the procedures for accountability and oversight so central to the founding and endurance of the country must remain strong. We must resist the appeals to morality and panic that can erode these procedures.
It would be foolish to elevate consent to an absolute, but neither should we continue to slide into a world where meaningful con- sent is only of historical interest. At best we can hope to find a compass rather than a map and a moving equilibrium rather than a fixed point for decision making.
Appreciating complexity is surely a virtue, but being immobilized by it is not. The default position should be meaningful consent, absent strong grounds for avoiding it. Consent involves participants who are fully aware of the surveil- lance system’s presence and potential risks and of the conditions under which it operates. Con- sent obtained through deception or unreason- able or exploitative seduction or to avoid dire consequences is hardly consent. The smile that accompanies the statement, “an offer you can’t refuse” reflects that understanding.
We must demand a principle of truth in vol- unteering; it is far better to say clearly that “as a condition of [entering here, working here, receiving this benefit, etc.] we require that you provide personal information.” A golden rule principle ought also to apply: Would the infor- mation collector be comfortable in being the subject, rather than the agent, of surveillance, if the situation were reversed? These are among twenty broad questions and related principles that I suggest be asked in any assessment of personal information collection.
We need to overcome the polite tendency to acquiesce when we are inappropriately asked for personal information. We need to just say “no” when, after we pay with a credit card, a cashier asks for a phone number or when a Web page or warranty form asks for irrelevant personal information or a video store seeks a Social Security number. Offering disinforma- tion may sometimes be appropriate. The junk mail I receive for Groucho and Karl gives me a laugh as well as a way to track the erroneous information I sometimes provide.
Finally, technology needs to be seen as an opportunity, rather than a problem. Technolo- gies can be designed to protect personal infor- mation and notify individuals when their in- formation is collected or has been compro- mised. Thus electronic silencers can inhibit third parties from overhearing cell-phone and face-to-face conversations, and computer pri-
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vacy screens can block sneaky peeks by any- one not directly in front of the screen. E-ZPass toll collection systems can be programmed to deduct payment, while protecting the anonym- ity of the driver. RFID technology can build in notification by requiring that the chip make physical contact with the sensor (for example, touching the card or item to the sensor), rather than permitting it to be read covertly at a dis- tance. Cell-phone cameras can be designed to emit a telltale sound before a picture is taken (this is required in Japan).
From one perspective, using technology to protect one’s personal information may offer legal support for an expectation of privacy. In Kyllo v. United States, a case involving the le- gality of a search warrant based on evidence from thermal-imaging technology, the dissent- ing judges argued that because the suspect did not take any actions to block the heat emis- sions that passed through his roof from his marijuana grow lights, he did not have an ex- pectation of privacy. There thus is no Fourth Amendment issue, and the police action should not require a warrant. This collapsing of what can be done with what is right involves an inverted logic. Once a technology becomes widely available and is well known, responsi- bility for protection shifts legally (as well of course as practically) to the individual, not to those who would cross personal borders. In failing to act in response to changed circum- stances beyond his or her control, the indi- vidual is seen to be making a choice and, in a sense, volunteering to be searched.
This blame-the-victim caveat subjectus logic cries out for a cartoon entitled, “Where will it end?” Beyond the paper shredder, which has become routine in many homes, the cartoon
would show a citizen protecting privacy by al- ways wearing gloves, a mask, and perfume; hav- ing a closely shaved head; talking in code and encrypting all communications; insulating home, office, and packages in thermal-image- resistant tinfoil; and only using restrooms cer- tified to be monitor free.
Sinclair Lewis hoped in 1935 that It Can’t Happen Here. But of course it can, and in some ways it has. Twenty years ago in reflec- tions on the year and book 1984, I wrote in these pages,
The first task of a society that would have lib- erty and privacy is to guard against the misuse of physical coercion by the state and private parties. The second task is to guard against the softer forms of secret and manipulative con- trol. Because these are often subtle, indirect, invisible, diffuse, deceptive, and shrouded in benign justifications, this is clearly the more difficult task.
Two decades later the hot-button cultural themes of threat, civil order, and security that Lewis emphasized are in greater ascendance and have been joined by the siren calls of con- sumption. If our traditional notions of liberty disappear, it will not be because of a sudden coup d’état. Nor will the iron technologies of industrialization be the central means. Rather, it will occur slowly, with an appeal to traditional American values in a Teflon- and sugar-coated technological context of low visibility, fear, and convenience.
Gary T. Marx is an electronic ( and itinerant scholar and author of Windows Into the Soul: Surveillance and Society in an Age of High Technology (University of Chicago Press, forth- coming).
David Altheide, Creating Fear: News and the Construction of
Crisis (Aldine de Gruyter, 2002).
Barry Glassner, The Culture of Fear (Basic Books, 2000).
Sinclair Lewis, It Can’t Happen Here (New York: Signet Clas-
sics, 1995, re-issued).
Gary Marx, “Seeing Hazily (But Not Darkly) Through the
Lens: Some Recent Empirical Studies of Surveillance Tech-
nologies” (Law and Social Inquiry, Spring 2005).
Ibid, “I’ll Be Watching You: The New Surveillance” (Dissent,
Winter 1985).
David Riesman. et al., The Lonely Crowd (Yale University
Press, 2001).
Rob Walker, “The Corporate Manufacture of Word of Mouth”
(New York Times Magazine, December 5, 2004).

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